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Abstract Previous research has found that housing investment has a
disproportionate role in the U.S. business cycle. This paper
demonstrates that the relationship between housing and the rest
of the economy has changed since ﬁnancial deregulation and
innovation in the early1980s. In particular, residential investment
increases both consumption, as well as non-residential
investment palpably more than in years past. Additionally, in the
pre-deregulation years, non-residential investment appeared to
crowd out housing activity. However, the results indicate that this
effect is smaller in the present era than before the early 1980s,
in all likelihood due to the switch from thrift-based ﬁnancing of
home mortgages to the current system in which secondary
mortgage markets play a predominant role.
Housing plays a very important role in the U.S. economy. Green (1997), for
instance, ﬁnds that residential investment is a leading indicator of GDP, but non-
residential investment is not. Gauger and Snyder (2003) discuss how housing
investment, despite being a small share of total output, plays a disproportionately
large role in the business cycle. Coulson and Kim (2000) similarly ﬁnd that
residential investment (hereafter RI) is more important for predicting GDP than
non-residential investment (NRI). The authors go on to discover a more detailed
reason for this state of affairs by disaggregating GDP into its components. RI is
found to have a signiﬁcant impact on consumption, while NRI does not. Leamer
(2007) ﬁnds that housing is such a uniquely reliable indicator of the U.S. business
cycle that he argues for a new Taylor Rule for monetary policy in which housing
conditions would replace GDP, and this would, in the author’s view, lead to better
policy and less volatile output. Benjamin, Chinloy, and Jud (2004) ﬁnd that
housing wealth affects consumption more than ﬁnancial wealth.
Given housing’s increasing signiﬁcance for the economy, it is important that
estimates of its impact are reasonably accurate. The papers by Green (1997) and
Gauger and Snyder (2003) note that the effect of housing on the business cycle
may have changed over the years. In particular, before the early 1980s, home330  Miles
loans were primarily provided by depository institutions, usually thrifts. Since
then, however, the system of housing ﬁnance has been transformed, and most
mortgages, once originated, become securitized. This new system more closely
resembles the ‘‘transactions-oriented model’’ of ﬁnance (Buiter, 2008) than the
‘‘relationships-oriented model’’ that existed before the 1980s. These changes in
the housing ﬁnance landscape have large implications for the underlying behavior
of housing and housing’s consequent effects on the rest of output over the business
cycle.
Accordingly, many papers examining aspects of the housing market, including the
impact of housing on output, have investigated whether there has been a change
in such impact since the early 1980s. Green (1997) ﬁnds little difference, in terms
of the magnitude of Granger causality test statistics, in the relationship between
RI and GDP before and after 1980. Gauger and Snyder (2003), on the other hand,
employ impulse response analysis, and ﬁnd that there is a much larger impact of
RI on GDP after 1980 than in the two decades before.
Thus there appear to be conﬂicting results in the literature regarding whether the
impact of RI on the economy has changed in recent decades. While both papers
are important contributions, there are problems of interpretation with both. Using
test statistics from Granger causality tests conveys little information about how
the magnitude of effects may have changed. And while Gauger and Snyder (2003)
provide a metric (impulse response analysis) that yields more information, the
results are, as we will discuss, questionable due to assumptions regarding the time
series properties of the variables in question.
Moreover, neither paper addresses the channel through which RI may be changing
its impact on the business cycle. Coulson and Kim (2000), as noted, ﬁnd that RI
affects GDP through consumption. The authors further examine the data and ﬁnd
that NRI has a negative impact on RI, due to a crowding out mechanism.
This paper examines how the relationships among RI, NRI, and the components
of output have changed over the last several decades. The ﬁnancial transformation
of home lending suggests, as will be explained, that the impact of RI on other
components of GDP, and vice-versa, may well have changed. Accordingly, the
relationship between RI and other GDP components in a VAR model is examined,
paying careful attention to the time-series properties of the variables, and allowing
for changing parameter values before and after the early 1980s. The ﬁndings reveal
that RI has more of an impact on consumption since these ﬁnancial changes than
before. The ﬁndings also reveal that RI increases NRI more than in the past.
Apparently, increased housing activity encourages not just consumers, but also
businesses, which spend more on new capital.
Additionally, while there is a positive impact of RI on NRI, there has been a
negative impact in the other direction, in that an increase in NRI tends to lower
RI, this ﬁrst being identiﬁed by Coulson and Kim (2000). The results show that
this crowding out effect is smaller since the early 1980s, as those seeking ﬁnancingHousing Investment and the U.S. Economy  331
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for mortgages have a much larger pool of funds to tap than in the thrift-dominated
era.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the previous literature.
The third section explains the data and methodology, and the fourth section details
the results. Finally, the ﬁfth section concludes.
 Previous Literature
Research into the effect of housing investment on output is naturally of interest
to any private or public sector entity interested not just in housing and real estate
but also on the state of the economy and getting more accurate forecasts of the
business cycle. Of course the state of the macroeconomy affects housing returns
(McCue and Kling, 1994). But housing and the economy also appear to directly
affect each other. Housing and the economy both follow cyclical patterns (Kaiser,
1997; and Pyhrr, Roulac, and Born, 1999). Recent interest in the impact of RI on
GDP arose in part from the controversy over whether the U.S. over-invested in
housing to the detriment of non-housing capital accumulation [Wheaton and
Nechayev (2008) ﬁnd that the 1998–2005 increase in house prices, for instance,
is not well explained by fundamentals]. Mills (1987) presented theoretical results
indicating that the U.S. experienced a misallocation of capital as too many
resources were put into housing. This may be due to the tax-deductibility of
mortgage interest. Devaney and Rayburn (1988), however, ﬁnd that the amount
of investment in housing in the U.S. is optimal from a portfolio management point
of view.
However, whatever the long run implications of possible distortions of capital
allocation in the U.S. as a result of housing, several authors have pointed out that
housing investment may play an important role in U.S. business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Green (1997) obtains quarterly data from 1959 through 1992 on RI, NRI, and
GDP. The author employs tests of Granger causality to determine whether housing
is a leading indicator of the business cycle. Results indicate that RI indeed
Granger-causes GDP, while NRI does not. He also ﬁnds that both RI and NRI are
each (separately) cointegrated with GDP according to the results of an Engle-
Granger test.
Coulson and Kim (2000) also explore the impact of RI on output. The authors
note that while Green’s (1997) results are interesting, testing for Granger causality
gives no indication of the magnitude of the impact of RI on output. The authors
therefore employ not just Granger causality tests but also impulse response
analysis and forecast error variance decompositions in a VAR. Additionally,
Coulson and Kim examine the effect of RI on the components of GDP, and not
just GDP itself. In this way, the authors show the channel through which housing
investment affects the rest of the economy.
Coulson and Kim’s (2000) results indicate that RI has a large impact on
consumption, and it is this channel through which housing affects output. NRI, in332  Miles
contrast, has little impact on GDP. The authors also discover in their regressions
that NRI has a negative impact on RI. Thus there is some crowding out of housing
activity when businesses are allocating capital to other uses.
Gauger and Snyder (2003) also explore the effect of housing investment on GDP.
Unlike Coulson and Kim (2000), these authors do not disaggregate GDP into its
components and thus do not examine the channels through which RI affects
output. The authors do pose an interesting question: Has the effect of RI on output
changed throughout the decades? All three papers on this topic use samples
beginning in 1959. Green’s (1997) sample ends in 1992, while Coulson and Kim’s
sample ends in the second quarter of 1997. Gauger and Snyder point out that in
the ﬁrst two decades of this sample, housing ﬁnance was highly regulated in the
U.S.
Indeed, many authors have remarked on the transformation of housing ﬁnance,
starting in the early 1980s. Prior to 1980, most mortgages in the U.S. were
ﬁnanced by depository banks, usually thrifts. Such institutions were subject to
Regulation Q, which limited the interest rates that thrifts could pay on deposits.
This made housing sensitive to changes in the economy and accordingly limited
the impact that housing could have on the rest of the economy. In particular, if
housing rose, and the rest of the economy, including NRI began to grow, interest
rates would rise. As a result, the thrifts would begin losing deposits, and have to
curtail mortgage lending, thus negatively impacting RI (Gauger and Snyder, 2003,
p. 338).
Since the early 1980s, however, there have been two important developments in
terms of ﬁnancial deregulation and innovation. First, Regulation Q was abolished
in 1980, thus lifting interest rate controls on lenders. When interest rates rise now,
it does not imply an outﬂow of deposits. Secondly, aided by the Government-
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Fannie and Freddie, a secondary market for
mortgages grew. This meant that there were now many sources of funds for
housing credit beyond depository thrifts. Pozdena (1990, p. 7) summarizes this
shift in mortgage ﬁnancing as follows. After discussing the lifting of deposit
rate ceilings, the author notes ‘‘In addition, the technology of the mortgage
marketplace was changing in the early 1980s. As a result of the continued
development of the secondary mortgage market, in particular the newly-originated
mortgages no longer needed to be funded within the bank or thrift portfolio.
Instead, mortgages could be used to create mortgage-backed securities which
could then be sold to a variety of institutional and private investors. This process,
known as securitization, was facilitated by government-backed mortgage agencies
which provided credit enhancement in the form of principal and interest guarantees
to investors in the securities. Development of the secondary mortgage market was
particularly rapid in the early 1980s. The volume of contracted mortgage
commitments of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), for
example, grew from about $7 billion in 1981 to almost $33 billion in 1983.’’
Pozdena (1990, p. 7) then goes on to explain that these changes should make
mortgage supply less sensitive to the business cycle. ‘‘First, the deregulation ofHousing Investment and the U.S. Economy  333
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deposit rates removed the primary cause of ﬁnancial disintermediation...This
presumably has had the effect of making mortgage supply less cyclically sensitive.
Second, the continued development of secondary mortgage markets also helped
to make mortgage supply less cyclical. A mortgage lender having difﬁculty
attracting funds can now originate a qualiﬁed mortgage, and sell it into a very
liquid secondary market.’’
The idea that ﬁnancial deregulation and innovation can make investment (and
consumer) spending less sensitive to economic shocks is detailed in Dynan, Sichel,
and Elmendorf (2006). The authors note that when borrowers can ﬁnd alternative
sources of funding, a shock, such as an interest rate increase, need not have much
negative impact on investment. This particularly applies to housing. By making
mortgage funding much more widely available, from many (including global)
sources, the end of regulation Q and the development of secondary markets should
make RI less sensitive to ‘‘crowding out’’ by NRI. Moreover, since a positive
impulse to housing is now less constrained, it should have a larger effect on the
rest of the economy.
These changes in the home lending sector have led to much research on how
housing ﬁnance has changed. Such papers focus on possible structural changes in
the early 1980s. For instance, Goebel and Ma (1993) present evidence that the
mortgage market became integrated with the more general credit market in 1980.
The authors ﬁnd, as evidence of integration, that mortgage rates and Treasury
rates were cointegrated starting in 1980, but not before. Bradley, Gabriel, and
Wohar (1995) investigate the impact of deposit ﬂows at thrifts on mortgage interest
rates over a sample spanning 1972:1–1989:5. These authors ﬁnd a structural break
at 1982:7, after which thrift ﬂows have much less effect on mortgage rates. This
makes sense given the abolition of Regulation Q and the development of
alternative ﬁnancing sources for housing through the secondary market. Pozdena
(1990) investigates the impact of interest rates and the ﬂows of funds to thrifts
and commercial banks on housing starts over the 1960–1989 period. The author
ﬁnds that both of the former variables affect the latter much less after 1982.
Given all of the changes in house ﬁnancing, it seems likely, given the reasoning
of Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel, that housing should be less affected by, and
hence have more impact, on the rest of the economy. Gauger and Snyder (2003)
accordingly gather data on RI, GDP, interest rates, and the M2 money supply,
over 1959–1999, and test for cointegration among them; the authors also use a
set of Chow tests for all twelve quarters from 1980 to 1982. They ﬁnd numerous
breaks over this period, and thus estimate two Vector Error Correction Models
(VECMs), eliminating the quarters in 1980 and 1981, for samples of 1959–1979
and 1982–1999. Using impulse response functions, the authors indeed ﬁnd
substantially larger effects of RI on GDP in the later, post-1979 data than in the
earlier sample. Housing investment thus appears more important for the economy
than it was in years past.
However, this result stands in some contrast to that obtained by Green (1997).
Green employs a CUSUM of squares test, which indicates a break in the data at334  Miles
the ﬁrst quarter of 1980—nearly the same quarter as that employed by Gauger
and Snyder (2003) as their breakpoint. When splitting the sample, the author ﬁnds
that Granger causality tests yield mostly similar results. NRI fails to impact GDP
in both time periods. RI, on the other hand, affects GDP in the 1980–1992 period,
although the null hypothesis of no such causation cannot quite be rejected at a
standard level in the 1959–1980 sample. However, the causality relationships
‘‘remain by and large the same,’’ (p. 263).
It could be, since Gauger and Snyder (2003) use impulse response functions,
which yield more information than Granger causality tests, that their results are
more reliable, and we can safely conclude that there was a substantial change in
the relationship between housing and the economy since ﬁnancial deregulation.
However, there are two important issues to address regarding these results. First,
Gauger and Snyder, like Green (1997), examine how RI affects aggregate output,
or GDP. Unlike Coulson and Kim (2000), they do not examine the effects of RI
on components of GDP, so they cannot see how RI affects output (i.e., does it
increase consumption, investment, etc.).
The second issue is that the results of Gauger and Snyder (2003), even regarding
aggregate GDP, may be questionable. The authors test for cointegration, using the
Johansen method, among RI, GDP, interest rates, and the money supply. They
ﬁnd that they can reject the null of no cointegration, that is, the variables are
cointegrated. However, for this test result to be correct, all of the variables being
tested must be integrated of the same order; in this case they must be I(1). The
authors had done ADF tests on all of the variables and found that all appeared to
have unit roots. However, Coulson and Kim (2000) tested RI for stationarity, and
found they could reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. Thus, unsurprisingly,
when Coulson and Kim tested for cointegration among RI, consumption, NRI,
and government spending (the latter three variables were nonstationary), they
cannot reject the null of no cointegration. Given the nonstationarity of the other
three variables, Coulson and Kim correctly estimate a VAR in ﬁrst differences.
This is important, since, if they are correct about RI being stationary, the ﬁnding
of cointegration among RI and other variables by Gauger and Snyder is incorrect
[Cheung and Lai (1993) show that the Johansen test often has poor size properties,
or over-rejection of the null of no cointegration]. And thus the VECM model is
mis-speciﬁed, making the results questionable.
A necessary condition for the VECM, as opposed to a VAR in ﬁrst differences,
to be the correct speciﬁcation is for RI to have a unit root. We will test for the
stationarity of RI using a new unit root test, which was designed to overcome the
power problems associated with the ADF test. As we will ﬁnd that RI is stationary,
a VAR in ﬁrst differences is the correct speciﬁcation.
 Data and Methodology
The task at hand is thus to determine the stationarity of the variables, which will
then tell us whether a VAR or VECM is the correct speciﬁcation, and to determineHousing Investment and the U.S. Economy  335
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whether a structural break has occurred. Gauger and Snyder (2003), as noted,
found RI nonstationary, while Coulson and Kim (2000) could not reject the null
of stationarity, and both sets of authors employed the ADF test. A problem that
has long plagued time series studies is that the ADF test is known to suffer from
low power when the series has an AR coefﬁcient that is large, but less, than unity.
That is, the use of the ADF test often leads to a failure to reject the null hypothesis
of a unit root when the process being tested is persistent but stationary.
Moreover, both the ADF and the popular alternative Phillips-Perron (PP) test
suffer from poor size (a tendency to over-reject the null and thus determine that
the series is stationary) when the variable contains a large, negative moving
average component (Schwert, 1989). Given these problems in testing for
stationarity, Ng and Perron (2001) have developed a test that improves on the
power and size properties of the ADF and PP methods. First, the test is conducted
on de-trended data, which the authors ﬁnd improves both the size and power of
unit root testing.
The other innovation of the Ng-Perron technique is that it has an improved lag-
selection algorithm. In testing for unit roots, using the ADF or PP method, one
must choose the number of lags in the series. Most of the methods currently in
use for lag selection in ADF and PP tests under-parameterize (choose too few
lags), which causes additional size and power distortions. So Ng and Perron (2001)
developed a lag selection criterion for their test that improves on previous
methods, and provides better power and size than ADF or PP tests. Therefore, RI,
NRI, consumption, and government spending for stationarity will be tested using
the Ng-Perron method, and the results will tell us the proper multivariate
speciﬁcation.
The data are obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s FREDS website.
They were originally gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. As with
the other three papers that have examined this topic, the series all start at the ﬁrst
quarter of 1959. Green’s (1997) sample ran through 1992, Coulson and Kim’s
(2000) through the second quarter of 1992, and Gauger and Snyder’s (2003)
through 1999. The data set in the current study runs through the ﬁrst quarter of
2007.
Results for the Ng-Perron unit root test are displayed in Exhibit 1. As noted, the
null of non-stationarity for consumption, government spending, and NRI cannot
be rejected. However, the null hypothesis of nonstationarity at is rejected at the
5% level for RI. This conﬁrms the ﬁnding of Coulson and Kim (2000). Thus RI
cannot be cointegrated with the other variables, as Coulson and Kim also found.
Coulson and Kim (2000) thus correctly employed a VAR in ﬁrst differences.
Employing this method, the sample is split to determine whether there are
substantial differences in the interactions of housing and the economy on each
other. This brings up the issue of choosing a break date. Given the discussion in
Pozdena (1990), as well as others, the major ﬁnancial changes in housing occurred336  Miles
Exhibit 1  Ng-Perron Unit Root Test Results
5% Critical Value 1% Critical Value Test Statistic
Consumption 23.8 17.3 1.39
NRI 23.8 17.3 7.45
RI 23.8 17.3 18.2*
Government 23.8 17.3 9.19
Notes: The Ng-Perron test utilizes de-trended data and a lag selection criteria to increase size and
power in comparison to other unit root tests. The asterisk next to RI indicates rejection of the unit
root hypothesis at the 5% level.
in the early 1980s. Accordingly, papers that investigate the ﬁnancial aspects of
the housing market, such as Pozdena, Goebel, and Ma (1993) and Bradley,
Gabriel, and Wohar (1995), as well as those that have previously studied the
interactions of housing and the economy such as Green (1997) and Gauger and
Snyder (2003), have either chosen or found through Chow or CUSUM-type tests,
a break in the months or quarters spanning 1980–1982.
Gauger and Snyder’s (2003) methodology is noteworthy. The authors compute
Chow test statistics for all quarters from 1980 to 1982. For the equations in which
RI or mortgage interest rates are the dependent variables, the largest breaks occur
in 1981:4. The authors then split the sample into two, 1959:1–1979:4 and 1982:
1–1999:4. The years 1980 and 1981 were not included in the sample. In this way,
if the change happened gradually, excluding the middle years of 1980 and 1981
would avoid any bias from the gradual nature of such structural change.
There are of course well-known size problems (i.e., a tendency to over-reject the
null of no structural change) associated with using the Chow test (Hansen, 1992).
Accordingly, the Andrews-Ploberger (1994) test of structural change is applied to
all four of the equations in the VAR. The results, available upon request, indicate
no signiﬁcant change in any of the equations, with the exception of RI, which
experienced one signiﬁcant change with respect to NRI on 1983:4. This is after
the break date chosen by the previous papers on housing, and the lack of a break
in the other equations might be taken as evidence that there has been no signiﬁcant
change. However, such a conclusion would be unwarranted. Hansen (2001)
himself indicates, that, in testing for structural change, it is more likely that a
given economic process has been subject to gradual change, rather than a one-
time sudden shift in parameter values. While there are techniques, such as smooth-
transition autoregressive (STAR) models that allow for such gradual shifts, they
apply only to univariate series, and not a system of equations like a VAR.
Thus, since the effect of ﬁnancial changes probably did not take place in just one
quarter, Gauger and Snyder are correct to rely on knowledge of the system ofHousing Investment and the U.S. Economy  337
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Exhibit 2  Structural Break Test Results
RI NRI
LR Test p-Value LR Test p-Value
1980:1 15.34 0.081 11.99 0.213
1980:2 15.39 0.080 12.07 0.209
1980:3 12.05 0.210 13.14 0.156
1980:4 18.26 0.032 13.83 0.128
1981:1 10.85 0.285 14.71 0.099
1981:2 16.08 0.065 14.4 0.108
1981:3 15.10 0.087 14.43 0.107
1981:4 14.27 0.112 14.96 0.092
1982:1 13.72 0.132 14.94 0.092
1982:2 14.11 0.118 13.22 0.152
1982:3 14.61 0.102 12.01 0.212
1982:4 13.99 0.122 10.21 0.333
1983:1 15.57 0.076 9.96 0.353
1983:2 18.50 0.030 9.26 0.412
1983:3 18.52 0.030 9.15 0.422
1983:4 18.66 0.028 7.50 0.584
Notes: Structural break results for consumption (available upon request) were never signiﬁcant and
hence are not displayed.
housing ﬁnance, investigate break points over a number of quarters, and then
eliminate some ‘‘middle’’ observations. This strategy is employed here. The Chow
test statistics for the quarters between 1980 and 1983 are examined for breaks,
for the RI, NRI, and consumption equations in the VAR. No signiﬁcant break for
consumption is found. As displayed in Exhibit 2, there are three breaks (1981:1,
1981:4, and 1982:1) for NRI, signiﬁcant at 10%. There are a number of signiﬁcant
breaks for RI. The largest breaks occur in 1983, as found by the Andrews-
Ploberger test. However, there are two prior breaks in for RI in 1981:2 and 1981:
3, also signiﬁcant at 10%. While these are not the largest for RI, they are
signiﬁcant, and they are just before the two largest signiﬁcant breaks for NRI.
Since there are signiﬁcant breaks ‘‘adjoining’’ each other for NRI and RI (1981:
2 and 1981:3 for the latter and 1981:4 and 1982:1 for the former), and given the
theory on the effect of ﬁnancial changes occurring in the early 1980s, as well as
the choice of such early 1980s dates as being important in other papers, and
following Gauger and Snyder (2003), the quarters 1981:2–1982:1 are eliminated,
and two separate VARs are estimated for the prior and subsequent periods.338  Miles
Exhibit 3  VAR Coefﬁcient Estimates
1959:1–1981:1 Sample
Ind. Variable Regressand C RI NRI G
C(1) 0.233 1.260 0.180 0.030
(0.108) (0.203) (0.616) (0.870)
C(2) 0.062 0.312 0.499 0.189
(0.662) (0.730) (0.163) (0.402)
RI(1) 0.032 0.276 0.106 0.019
(0.090) (0.020) (0.020) (0.510)
RI(2) 0.021 0.193 0.000 0.026
(0.270) (0.110) (0.99) (0.386)
NRI(1) 0.103 0.604 0.188 0.168
(0.054) (0.070) (0.150) (0.048)
NRI(2) 0.033 0.590 0.190 0.080
(0.514) (0.070) (0.145) (0.329)
G(1) 0.005 0.15 0.232 0.156
(0.937) (0.720) (0.180) (0.156)
G(2) 0.048 0.310 0.010 0.054
(0.487) (0.47) (0.933) (0.62)
R2 0.174 0.29 0.362 0.101
Adj. R2 0.091 0.22 0.298 0.011
Notes: All of the variables are in log-differences. p-values are in parentheses.
Granger causality tests, impulse response analysis, and forecast error variance
decomposition are employed. The approach here is similar to that of Friedman
and Kuttner (1992), who examine the relationship among macroeconomic
variables before and after 1970. The authors found that monetary disturbances
were less powerful in recent decades than they had been in the 1960s. Similarly,
this work examines how RI has changed in the way it affects and is affected by
the rest of the economy.
 Results
Exhibits 3–6 show the results of the two ﬁrst-difference VARs and Granger
causality tests for the two periods. Two lags are employed, as in Coulson and
Kim (2000). Exhibit 3 contains the results for the 1959:1–1981:1 period. Note
that in the consumption equation, both lags of RI are positive, but neither is
individually signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This contrasts with Coulson and Kim,
who found in their sample through the second quarter of 1997 that the ﬁrst lag
of RI had a signiﬁcant effect on consumption. They also found that the F-test forHousing Investment and the U.S. Economy  339
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Exhibit 4  Granger Causality Test Results
1959:1–1981:1 Sample
Caused Causal C RI NRI G
C 1.510 2.030 1.455 0.268
(0.226) (0.137) (0.239) (0.764)
RI 0.686 5.280 5.990 0.268
(0.506) (0.006) (0.00) (0.764)
NRI 3.980 6.150 3.900 1.044
(0.022) (0.000) (0.023) (0.356)
G 0.496 0.028 2.020 1.290
(0.61) (0.972) (0.138) (0.278)
Note: p-values are in parentheses.
Exhibit 5  VAR Coefﬁcient Estimates
1982:2–2007:1 Sample
Ind. variable Regressand Cons. RI NRI G
C(1) 0.084 1.480 0.460 0.090
(0.476) (0.010) (0.259) (0.690)
C(2) 0.007 0.459 0.427 0.273
(0.949) (0.414) (0.291) (0.235)
RI(1) 0.047 0.743 0.047 0.040
(0.039) (0.000) (0.543) (0.350)
RI(2) 0.024 0.060 0.221 0.021
(0.241) (0.530) (0.002) (0.590)
NRI(1) 0.012 0.498 0.250 0.069
(0.674) (0.000) (0.014) (0.228)
NRI(2) 0.048 0.054 0.322 0.016
(0.090) (0.688) (0.001) (0.769)
G(1) 0.082 0.591 0.149 0.056
(0.153) (0.030) (0.446) (0.614)
G(2) 0.035 0.422 0.167 0.067
(0.546) (0.137) (0.410) (0.560)
R2 0.218 0.603 0.523 0.051
Adj. R2 0.15 0.568 0.481 0.032
Notes: All of the variables are in log-differences. p-values are in parentheses.340  Miles
Exhibit 6  Granger Causality Test Results
1982:2–2007:1 Sample
Caused Causal C RI NRI G
C 0.290 5.404 0.240 1.890
(0.747) (0.005) (0.786) (0.156)
RI 3.450 3.090 4.440 0.512
(0.035) (0.000) (0.014) (0.600)
NRI 3.120 12.420 13.880 0.048
(0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.952)
G 0.280 0.140 0.479 0.349
(0.755) (0.860) (0.620) (0.705)
Note: p-values are in parentheses.
Granger causality indicated that RI did Granger-cause consumption in their
sample. Here the null of no Granger causality for the 1959:1–1981:1 sample
cannot be rejected, as the F-stat of 2.03 (displayed in Exhibit 4) is smaller than
Coulson and Kim’s of 5.41. Thus, consumption appears to have become more
sensitive to real estate in the last several decades of ﬁnancial deepening.
This result is conﬁrmed in Exhibit 5, which uses the 1982:2–2007:1 sample. In
the consumption equation for the post-deregulation years, the ﬁrst lag of RI is
signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and positive, while the second lag is not signiﬁcant
but still positive. In Exhibit 6, the F-stat for the Granger causality test is 5.404,
which is signiﬁcant at less than the 1% level. Again the evidence strongly supports
the hypothesis that in the post-deregulation era, housing has become more
important for the U.S. economy, as it now has a larger effect on consumption.
Another channel through which RI may affect output is the impact on NRI.
Coulson and Kim (2003) already found some results indicating an effect in the
opposite direction—that NRI crowds out RI. Both directions of this relationship
are examined here.
In the ﬁrst, pre-deregulation period in Exhibit 3, the ﬁrst lag of RI is positive on
non-real estate investment; the second is negative but insigniﬁcant. The Granger
causality test statistic in Exhibit 4 is 6.15, with a p-value of 0.003. Thus even
before deregulation, housing investment appeared to increase NRI. In terms of
positive effects, housing activity should increase demand for materials and
consumer durables, likely giving businesses in these industries more optimism
about the future, raising demand for investment. At the same time, when the
housing market is in turmoil, in addition to causing business pessimism, bank
lending is sometimes harmed by mortgage defaults, and the supply of credit forHousing Investment and the U.S. Economy  341
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new investment is lowered. Indeed, fears have been expressed that the recent sub-
prime mortgage difﬁculties may cause a tightening of credit to other sectors.
For the 1982:2–2007:1 sample in Exhibit 5, the ﬁrst lag of RI is much larger in
magnitude than it was for the earlier sample, while the second is still insigniﬁcant.
The F-stat for Granger causality in Exhibit 5 is 12.42, and the p-value is 0.00001.
Thus based simply on Granger causality tests it appears that housing has palpably
increased its impact on the U.S. business cycle, as it has a greater impact on both
consumption and investment.
As noted, Coulson and Kim (2003) found, based on the coefﬁcients of their VAR,
a negative impact of NRI on RI. Both lags of NRI had negative coefﬁcients in
the RI equation, and the ﬁrst had a t-stat of 3.35. The Granger causality test stat
for this 1959–1997:2 sample was 10.08, which strongly suggests a crowding-out
effect.
For the 1959:1–1981:1 sample, the coefﬁcients of the two lags of NRI in the RI
equation are 0.604 and 0.59, respectively, with p-values of 0.07 each. The
Granger causality test for joint signiﬁcance of the two lags is 5.59. This is smaller
than the F-stat found by Coulson and Kim (2003), but this may be due to the
smaller sample size.
In the 1982:2–2007:1 sample, the ﬁrst lag has a negative coefﬁcient of 0.498
and a p-value of 0.0006, while the second lag is positive but completely
insigniﬁcant, with a p-value of 0.688. The F-stat for Granger causality is 4.44,
which is smaller than that for the 1959:1–1981:1 sample. Overall there thus
appears to be less crowding in recent years than in decades past. This will be
conﬁrmed more formally with the impulse response and forecast error variance
decomposition analysis.
While Granger causality tests from the reduced-form VAR are informative for
forecasting purposes, it may not be prudent to take too strong a structural inference
from the results. Following Coulson and Kim (2003), two estimates of Impulse
Response Functions (IRFs) and Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (FEVDs)
from the two samples are examined. These estimates require assumptions about
the ordering of the variables, or some other identifying assumptions about the
structure of the model.
Coulson and Kim (2003) apply a technique developed by Swanson and Granger
(1997) based on the VAR residuals to determine the most plausible orderings.
They ﬁnd two orderings from this technique: C-RI-NRI-G and NRI-RI-C-G (C
and G stand for consumption and government, respectively). The authors ﬁnd,
regardless of which ordering is employed, that RI has a strong effect on output,
indeed a much larger effect than that of NRI. Therefore, both orderings of VARs
are employed to examine the IRFs and FEVDs in the two periods.
As displayed in Exhibit 7, when the ﬁrst ordering is employed for IRFs, a one-
standard deviation shock has a positive effect in the ﬁrst period, but a noticeably342  Miles
















larger (and longer-lasting) effect in the second. Moreover, while the standard errors
of the IRFs are not displayed in order to maintain clarity of presentation (results
are available upon request), the impact of a shock in the ﬁrst period is not
statistically signiﬁcant, while the impact in the second is signiﬁcant at the 5%
level for ﬁve consecutive quarters. This differential effect between the two periods
is also true under the second ordering, as displayed in Exhibit 8.
Examining the effect of RI on investment, using the ﬁrst ordering, there is a
positive effect in the ﬁrst period, but as displayed in Exhibit 9, the effect is larger
(and more signiﬁcant) for more quarters in the second period. This same
differential effect between the different decades is maintained in the second
ordering in Exhibit 10.
Examining the crowding out effect that NRI has been shown to exert on RI,
Exhibit 11 shows that, under the ﬁrst ordering, the crowding our is much more
pronounced before 1981 than since. This is also the case in Exhibit 12, under the
second ordering, although here the difference between the two periods is not quite
as large. Still, the results even here indicate that crowding out is not as pronounced
in this era of more global capital. The impact of consumption on RFI is shown
in Exhibits 13 and 14. In this case, there is little difference between the responses
in the two periods, for either ordering. Overall, however, the IRFs conﬁrm the
changing relationships that the Granger causality tests suggested.
The evidence from the forecast error variance decompositions is also compelling
(Exhibits 15–16). With the ﬁrst ordering, RI explains 3.85% of the consumptionHousing Investment and the U.S. Economy  343
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1959:1–1981:1 3.85 10.96 13.83
1982:2–2007:1 12.90 27.70 9.02
Notes: The percentage refers to the percent of forecast error variance explained after ten quarters.
FEVD after ten quarters in the ﬁrst period, but 12.9% in the second. Under the
second ordering, the results are similar; RI explains 13.84% of consumption’s
FEVD in the ﬁrst period, but 22.7% since deregulation and ﬁnancial innovation.
For NRI, 10.96% of the FEVD is explained by RI in the ﬁrst period under the
ﬁrst ordering, while 27.7% is explained in the second. In the second ordering, theHousing Investment and the U.S. Economy  347
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1959:1–1981:1 13.84 13.24 22.56
1982:2–2007:1 22.70 31.15 9.27
Notes: The percentage refers to the percent of forecast error variance explained after ten quarters.
relevant numbers are 13.24% and 31.15%. In contrast, under the ﬁrst ordering,
13.83% of the FEVD of RI is explained by NRI in the ﬁrst decades, while only
9.02% is explained after the early 1980s. With the second ordering, 22.56% of
RIs FEVD is explained by NRI in the 1959–1981:1 sample, while only 9.27% is
explained since deregulation. Overall, the FEVD results indicate, as do the
Granger causality tests and IRF estimates, that consumption and NRI are more
sensitive to RI than in previous years, while RI is less crowded out by NRI than
before the 1980s.
 Conclusion
The results of the VAR analysis clearly indicate that housing is indeed important
for the U.S. business cycle, and it has become even more important since the
changes in ﬁnancial deregulation and innovation since the early 1980s. While the
effect of housing on consumption has been a topic of discussion in the popular
press (and indeed a matter of concern as housing activity has declined, in the
aggregate since mid-2005), it is notable that both consumption and investment
appear to have increased their dependence on housing in recent years. Thus the
business cycle is now more sensitive to housing than at any time since reliable
statistics have been collected.
Given Keynes’ conjecture about the business cycle being driven by volatile
investment, these results should be of interest to any private or public sector
forecaster trying to gauge the path of the economy, as these ﬁndings indicate that
housing investment is an ever-growing driver of recessions and booms. Exactly
how government policy should respond remains a topic for future research.
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